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Most authorities who write about Anglo-American legal history view 
property or civil law as disinterested. By disinterested, they mean simply 
that the civil cases which come to court are of interest only for their 
claims on others. Such cases have little immediate social importance.1 
Yet, a look at the case volume in the Suffolk County Court for the years 
1671-1680 reveals an erratic pattern that suggests some social cause 
(Graph 1). This strange pattern demands explanation. Functional 
theory can supply an explanation while the reassertion of disinterestedness 
in civil law cannot.2 
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At its best, functional theory provides for the interplay between values 
in a community and collective behavior. It asserts that general behavioral 
patterns tend to support and maintain structures and values in com-
munities. My thesis here is that a functional analysis of religious, politi-
cal and military history during the decade of the 1670's reveals a 
plausible functional connection between the corporate values of Puritan 
culture and the fluctuation of case volume in the Suffolk County Court. 
Events in sequence and changes in the volume of cases make me think 
that, by means of legal participation, civil litigants collectively and 
unconsciously supported corporate values. 
Before I go any further, I must say that my intention is not to 
refight the battle of functional theory. Functionalism provides for dif-
ferences between internal and external stress in and on communities, for 
behavioral or functional substitutes when a community is under stress, 
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and for behavioral changes which seem to follow certain patterns or 
values.3 All of these elements are important parts of my explanation 
because they exist in the history and in the legal behavior. Functional 
theory merely provides a format through which possible connections can 
be posed.4 
Of course, my thesis is not verifiable in any conventional sense. There 
are no documents in the civil case records which say that John Smith 
"felt" moved to support authority or other corporate values by initiating 
a suit. There are only the several historical crises which drew from 
leadership authoritative value statements, the cases themselves which 
appear fairly routine, and the reasonable theoretical assumption that in 
a small community, like Massachusetts Bay, religious, political and social 
values were important. Theology provided a collective behavioral im-
perative as well as a satisfying explanation of a social world based on 
both status and contract. We know that the Puritans were legalistic, that 
they emphasized contract theory as a social explanation of themselves and 
that they believed in social or corporate cohesiveness. 
On the other hand, my thesis is testable and therefore falsifiable. If 
a more conventional history of the decade can account equally well 
for the history, the values and the erratic case volume, I would withdraw 
my thesis. As I make clear below, I see no cohesive explanation which 
can account for this history. Moreover, in current scholarship I see 
support for my viewpoint that, especially among the Puritans, values and 
specific behavior were somehow interrelated.5 I think I see one such 
interrelationship. 
A statement on Puritan values is necessary to this treatment of events 
and behavior, but their set of values are so well known that the state-
ment can be brief. Leadership and authority, corporate duty to the 
Puritan state, territorial integrity under theocratic sponsorship—this set 
of corporate values was, as the Puritans saw it, under attack during the 
religious, military and political crises of the 1670's. In response to these 
attacks the Puritans brought into play another set of values: the im-
portance of legal or proper behavior. Through legislative ritual they 
reasserted behavioral compacts or contracts between themselves and 
God, and they passed laws, behavioral contracts, in which behavior was 
legally specified. 
Recent scholarship has suggested that the Puritans successfully inte-
grated these two sets of values.6 Students of colonial history have been 
asked to change their views about values and how they affected this 
corporate society. I propose to expand our ideas about these known 
sets of values to include legal behavior. Hence, my thesis involves, to 
some extent, changing our notions about law in Puritan society. As 
George Haskins pointed out in his excellent study of Puritan law, the 
Puritans used the common law tradition of disinterestedness or im-
partiality toward individual cases.7 But I believe that, in addition to 
the disinterested handling of individual claims, law functioned corpo-
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rately by means of the changes in social or collective legal participation, 
case volume, particularly in times of social or collective stress when the 
integration of and support for values would have been important.8 
Data for this study are a compilation of all civil cases, including 
appeals, from the Suffolk County Court Records.9 This court was one 
of four county courts which the General Court of Massachusetts estab-
lished in 1644. The Suffolk Court sat at Boston, the seat of government 
as well as the center of trade in the colony. It drew cases from all 
geographical areas of Massachusetts Bay, and the cases represented all 
classes of interest. It was the court most under the direct control of the 
governor and other prominent assistants, probably the most conservative 
court and almost certainly the most representative of Puritan legal 
propriety. 
Graph 1 is a display of the cases brought by the population be-
ginning in October, 1671, and running through January, 1679-80 (old 
style). County courts sat four sessions per year with the division of the 
year coming in March rather than in January. Months covered are 
usually October, January, May and July—the months during which the 
court usually sat. Following Samuel Eliot Morison's organization, I have 
adopted a cross-calendar plan, October, 1671 to July, 1672, October, 1672 
to July, 1673, and so forth. Thus, the cases reported are those cases 
which proceeded through the legal process, October through July, in the 
years given. Numbers of cases noted on Graph 1 are exclusive of those 
cases withdrawn or non-suited.10 
For the terms 1671-72, the number of cases through the court was 89. 
The following year it was down to 77, and for the next three years it 
remained fairly constant, changing by an increase of only three cases for 
the 1673-74 terms, the same for the 1674-75 terms and decreasing by three, 
back to seventy-seven, for the 1675-76 terms. A sudden erratic rise and 
almost equally sharp drop and rise again during the next few years is 
obviously an odd pattern for a court which represented continuity in 
the government and community. In 1676-77, case volume shows a 
sudden increase of 49 cases. In 1676-77, a volume of cases declined steeply 
by 38. Following the decline was a second increase in 1678-79 of 20 
cases. If the graph were continued, a projection for 1679-80 would show 
another increase of 11. 
During these years social and political pressure came from three well-
known episodes of Massachusetts history—the quarrel about the Half-
Way Covenant, King Philip's War and Edward Randolph's attack on the 
Massachusetts government. In the Half-Way quarrel the Puritans faced 
an internal crisis which involved their religion and their politics. Pre-
sentation of the values involved requires a rather intricate rehearsal of 
the political events. Values such as authority, corporate duty and sup-
port of the state were at issue. Both of the other two crises were external, 
and for these a brief retelling is sufficient to understand the involvement 
of values. In these two external crises the Puritans believed that outside 
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forces were attacking their foundations: leadership, territorial integrity 
and thus their contract with God, corporate duty and religious exclu-
siveness. In all three episodes the central concern of the Puritans was 
authority, their most important legitimating principle. Each crisis pre-
cedes a sudden change in the volume of cases. 
Controversy about the 
Half-Way Covenant involved 
religious and political values 
as well as political action. 
Church membership, office-
holding and the franchise 
were tied together by law. 
Members of churches were 
the elect, and they ran the 
government. Those who sup-
ported the Half-Way Cove-
nant avoided naming the 
elect. Instead they sought to 
give half-way membership to 
people whose parents had not 
been among the elect and 
who were not automatically 
qualified for baptism. Any-
one who led an upright life 
was thus fit for recognition by 
the church even though he 
had not yet experienced the "quickening" of the spirit.11 Between 1648, 
when the new covenant was proposed, and 1667, when questions about 
its controversial provision created a political crisis, the full political im-
plications of the half-way principle were usually ignored. 
In 1667 John Wilson died leaving the First Church of Boston without 
a minister. First Church was one of the ''conservative'* churches where 
the half-way principle had been slowly eased into the church polity. 
It had never been formally adopted by the congregation. After Wilson's 
death the members of the church met and voted to call John Davenport 
of New Haven, a famous opponent of the new covenant. Davenport had 
a vision of the original New Israel in the wilderness, a vision of the 
church and state much like the one John Winthrop had brought from 
England. Davenport was acquainted with prominent members of the 
First Church, and he was most eager to accept this invitation to the 
most powerful church in New England. Robert Pope notes that Daven-
port planned to use the First Church to bring the New England congre-
gations back to the reformist covenant which they had first adopted.12 
Graph 1. Cases per year, Suffolk County Court. 
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Although a majority faction of Boston's First Church agreed on 
Davenport, a large minority faction disagreed. His ideas about baptism 
excluded any softening of the original prohibition against baptising or 
acknowledging the children of non-members. Beyond these basic in-
gredients for a disagreement in Boston was the broader issue of Daven-
port's release from New Haven. The congregation there was willing to 
loan Davenport to Boston, but not to release him. He arrived on loan 
in the spring of 1668. Finally, Davenport did produce a letter of release 
and in December, 1668, was ordained. After a period of internal strife 
the minority faction called a council and, under censure from First 
Church, created a new congregation, Third Church. 
During spring, 1669, Nicholas Street, representing the New Haven 
congregation, was in Boston to close affairs between New Haven and 
Davenport. Street discovered that the letter of release was a forgery. 
Anthony Stoddard and John Leverett, prominent political men and 
members of First Church, Boston, expressed shock over the forgery, but 
Davenport explained it away. He called it an effort on the part of the 
elders to avoid further discontent with the transfer. Although the con-
gregation voted to accept his explanation, other ministers in the colony 
could not accept it. Sympathy lay with the members of the new Third 
Church. 
In May, 1669, when Governor Bellingham, one of Davenport's sup-
porters, delayed construction of a Third Church meeting house, he 
brought out the political issues in the quarrel.13 Third Church was 
forced to apply to the General Court for permission to build, and a 
majority of the ministers found themselves allied with the new con-
gregation against the powerful, authoritative and conservative forces of 
Governor Bellingham and First Church. The congregation won permis-
sion to build and thus won for the ministers the initial political battle 
over the half-way issue. 
As the political implications of the quarrel became more open, Daven-
port moved into an offensive position. A famous and now very prominent 
man, he had been asked to preach the election sermon in May, 1669. In 
the sermon he attacked the gathering of Third Church and attacked the 
Half-Way Covenant, claiming it led to a decline in congregational vigor. 
Davenport warned the political leaders of the colony that New England 
would have to return to the original covenant or else God would disown 
the Puritans.14 The deputies or representatives had asked Davenport to 
give the sermon, and the invitation shadowed a political alliance between 
his conservative friends and the representatives of outlying townships. 
After the sermon the deputies voted to thank Davenport for his 
effort and to print the sermon. Members of the upper house, the as-
sistants, refused to agree to either vote and sent back to the deputies a 
mild admonition which told them to stay out of church politics. Battle 
over religious and political ideals had broken into the open among the 
members of a divided government. Lt. Governor Francis Willoughby 
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and seven other assistants were protecting and shepherding Third Church 
in its fight with Davenport and the deputies. Governor Bellingham and 
five assistants stood allied with First Church and Davenport. 
John Leverett asked Third Church to delay Peter Thacher's ordina-
tion as minister. Davenport seized the opportunity to ally his following 
with Leverett who only hoped to avoid schism. In a masterful political 
move, Davenport turned the issue away from baptism toward congrega-
tional autonomy by blaming the general council for the crisis. Third 
church, he said, had been encouraged to divide from its true congrega-
tion, a clear violation of congregational principle. This accusation al-
lowed Davenport and his political allies to draw into a focused position 
the more conservative-minded membership of churches throughout the 
colony. These churchmen, allied with the deputies, found themselves 
divided from a majority of the ministers. The fight had come down to 
conservatives against liberals, purists against innovators, among political 
and religious leaders. Religious and political authority, usually allied 
in Massachusetts, were split, and corporate values were under pressure 
as people were forced to choose sides. 
Samuel Danforth in his now famous sermon, A Brief Recognition of 
New England's Errand Into the Wilderness, delivered before the Gen-
eral Court in 1670, laid before the political conservatives the objections 
of the clergy. He condemned the laity of the churches, blaming them 
for the schism which was developing in the colony.15 In contrast, when 
the deputies answered a petition from the church at Hadley, they blamed 
the clergy for controversy and decline. As contention increased, concern 
increased among the assistants. Finally, turning to a time-honored prac-
tice in the colony, the assistants asked the ministers to consider the 
issue and to return a suggestion for healing the political schism.16 
But the ministers were not content to consider the problem. Instead, 
they entered an active campaign against the anti-clerical conservatives 
among the deputies. By means of the election in 1671, the ministers 
brought to Massachusetts Bay a sharp change in the old, slow-moving 
pattern of electoral representation. Sixteen deputies were defeated. Eight 
towns which usually failed to send deputies did so in 1671. Five, rather 
than their usual lone representative, sent their allotted two. 
This reform election reached into Boston, too. Five members of Third 
Church were selected to represent outlying towns. Thomas Clarke, Jr., a 
member of First Church and a prominent merchant, was replaced by 
Thomas Savage of Third Church. In the upper house John Leverett 
replaced Lt. Governor Willoughby, deceased, and William Stoughton 
took Leverett's place among the assistants. The balance of power in the 
upper house remained the same, seven in favor of Third Church and the 
new covenant, five in favor of First Church and the old way, but the 
liberal elements triumphed when they placed so many men in the lower 
house.17 
Massachusetts clergymen, seemingly so successful in their political 
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efforts, were successful as well in their attempt to have the deputies' 
charges against them dismissed. They presented a long defense of the 
Half-Way Covenant which was, they said, no innovation but a continua-
tion of true reformation. Moreover, they charged that by barring chil-
dren from membership in the church, the deputies were undermining the 
churches of the colony. After this presentation, the deputies rescinded 
their former charges against the clergy (even though at the same time 
they petulantly asserted their right to free debate).18 
A religious/political crisis was ended, but it continued to rankle.19 
In their post-crisis sermons the ministers identified three factions which 
had arisen during the quarrel—the conservative laity who were duly 
submissive after the clerical victory, the reasonable laity who were 
always allied with the clergy and its "continuing reformation," and the 
"civil men" who were delighted to see the religious factions quarreling 
at the expense of religious power and prestige.20 By identifying these 
groups, the ministers took full advantage of their position, but they 
also kept politics before their congregations. The value issue remained 
important even though the power issue had been met and settled. 
Until this internal crisis, authority had been unified and was viewed 
as a positive aspect of Puritan society by both sources of legitimacy and 
power—political leadership and the clergy. Corporate duty had been 
fairly clear and, as a value, was easily translated into support for the 
Puritan state. After the ministers' intrusion into active politics, an 
active political culture existed. Within this new political arena of subtly 
altered values, politics had to function.21 Hence, there was a new 
avenue of support for values. 
If civil cases had been supplying support for values before the Half-
Way crisis, one could reasonably expect a decrease in the number of 
cases because the necessary support would move through another chan-
nel. A decrease in the number of cases does occur, from 89 cases in 
1671-72 to 77 in 1672-73'. As the display on Graph 1 makes clear, this 
change is not as dramatic as the later changes in case volume. Never-
theless, it does provide an indication that civil law cases may have func-
tioned at the social or collective level in Puritan society. They may 
have provided a level of necessary functional support for the overall inte-
gration of values and power. I suggest that in this instance the level of 
support fell as a consequence of a functional alternative—politics. 
iii 
Thomas Hutchinson in his History of Massachusetts Bay notes the 
single disturbance during the three years between 1672 and 1675. It 
was the Anglo-Dutch War of 1672. During the war the Dutch briefly 
reconquered New Amsterdam. Massachusetts declared war on the Dutch 
and raised troops which never moved out of the colony. In a footnote 
Hutchinson says that the Puritans subscribed LI,895.02.09 for rebuilding 
Harvard College.22 
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Data for these quiet years suggest that politics as a functional sub-
stitute was at least partially maintained. Moreover, the level of activity 
for the year of King Philip's War supports the idea that a level of civil 
cases was functionally important in this corporate society. If the level 
represented a strict disinterestedness, one could reasonably expect a 
steep decline in legal business during this year for the sufficient cause 
that so many among the population were engaged in the war. A 
reduction of only three cases is amazing when one considers that the 
colony was fighting a war on its own territory. 
King Philip's War brought external pressures to bear on the corporate 
society, pressures which could not be handled by changing the internal 
political system. New England had some indication that Indian trouble 
was possible. Leaders in New Plymouth had required King Philip of 
the Wampanoags to sign a treaty of alliance.23 Despite this treaty, Philip 
and several Narraganset leaders were scheming to bring together a 
force of some 4,000 Indians of various tribes. Overall, their plan was 
to make war on the English and to drive them out of the territory.24 
Rumors about such a plan had circulated in the towns between 1673 
and 1675, but, prepared at all times for defense, the people of Massa-
chusetts remained unconcerned until the village of Swansea in New 
Plymouth was attacked by the Wampanoag Indians on June 20, 1675. 
Massachusetts immediately raised troops, but they failed to stop 
Philip. The Indians attacked more vigorously. Nipmucks assaulted Men-
don, Massachusetts, killing five people. Next, the Nipmucks attacked 
Brookfield, about 20 miles west of Mendon. They then joined forces 
with Philip and the Wampanoags in a swamp near Brookfield. Fighting 
was concentrated in the Connecticut Valley at the Massachusetts frontier 
—Deerfield, Hatfield, Hadley, Northampton, Springfield—with battles at 
Bloody Brook and Hopewell Swamp hard by the Connecticut River and 
some 50 miles north of the Massachusetts-Connecticut border.25 
In November, recognizing that the war was spreading and that the 
colonials were losing, the General Court swung into action, taking up 
the New England ritual as it had so often during periods of social stress. 
It passed 20 articles of war, some of which were merely necessary in the 
face of general war and some of which were reaffirmations of the old 
contractual and corporate faith. For example, the first was, "Let no man 
presume to blaspheme the holy and blessed trinity, . . ." and the third 
was a reaffirmation of the law requiring inhabitants to attend public 
worship. Articles eight, nine, and ten were assertions of authority, re-
quiring complete submission to officials both civil and military. Twelve, 
thirteen, fourteen, and fifteen dealt with behavioral offenses: drunkenness 
in officers, rape and "unnatural abuses," fornication and "other dissolute 
lasciviousness," and theft. Eighteen required any soldiers "sinfully play-
ing away their arms at dice or cards" to be kept as scavengers until they 
could rearm themselves.26 
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At this session, the assembled leaders of the colony also listed the 
"provoking evils" of the inhabitants—failure to discipline children, 
the tendency to wear long hair, excesses in apparel, and the toleration 
of Quakers who were bringing into the colony their "damnable heresies, 
abominable idolâtries." Worshipers in the meeting houses were turning 
from meeting before the blessing was pronounced, thereby "profaning" 
worship. The General Court passed laws to stop these practices. At the 
same court the legislators provided for the supervision of young men, 
made swearing illegal (as it already was) and made failure to report 
swearing a like offense to the act itself. They struck at the "woeful" 
breach of the fifth commandment, "contempt of authority, civil ecclesi-
astical, and domestical," noting that such contempt "is a severe trial" to 
God and that in the past it had "provoked" him into punishing civil 
states. 
To these social, religious and political demands and prohibitions the 
Puritan leadership added a directive which was disobeyed by many: 
inhabitants of towns under attack were to remain in their towns or 
forfeit lands and goods. Later, during the session of May, 1676, the 
General Court provided care for the "distracted," the psychological 
casualties of the Indian War.27 Religious and political values such as 
authority, central power, stability were obviously the concerns of the 
government. 
Clearly, the Puritans were undergoing a period of great tension. 
Yet, this tension was quite unlike that of the Half-Way crisis. This crisis 
was precipitated not from within the religious center of the organized 
community, but from outside. It influenced elements of the political 
environment in ways that threatened loss of control. Controlled territory 
was shrinking. Controlled religion had already changed. Social organi-
zation and control, supposedly based on religion, were failing in western 
areas and were shaky in Boston. 
Thus threatened, Puritan leadership grew defensive and reactionary, 
striking out against those "evils" which their beliefs had already identi-
fied. They reaffirmed the legality of their religion, the importance of 
authority and, finally, of corporate or mutual submission to the ideals 
which they supported. Lacking any "open" political solution to this 
crisis, they turned to the old legal solution: reaffirmation of their re-
ligious, social and political contracts with God. They acted in reaffirma-
tion of these values, too. Philip of the Wampanoags was killed in August 
of 1676. By that time courts were in session throughout the colony. At 
the sessions of October, 1676, and May, 1677, the General Court moved 
to clear away the remaining business of the war. They supplied men 
and material for the war in Maine where some military action con-
tinued for another year. They refused to allow a group of the displaced 
to migrate to New York, provided for resettlement of several homeless 
persons, and heard monetary claims from widows and others who had 
suffered personal or property damage by the military.28 
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While the political leadership acted, cases came into the Suffolk Court 
in increasing numbers. Between October, 1676, and July, 1677, the 
number of civil cases in the court was 126, an increase of 49 cases over 
the previous year. People who brought these cases were mostly from 
Suffolk County, and the cases they brought were the usual cross section 
of interests. (Only six cases for all the remaining decade were directly 
related to the war itself.) Cases show that damages and claims arising 
from such damages do not account for this sudden increase in case 
volume. Backlog from the war cannot account for the increase because 
there was no significant reduction during the fighting. Another con-
ventional possibility would be displacement of persons by the war, but 
displacement is not apparent from an examination of the people and 
cases. Moreover, as I have already noted, during this period other 
courts in the colony were in session.29 Hence, out of a set of compelling 
circumstances, this dramatic increase in case volume supports the idea 
that civil case volume performed some type of functional support in 
the Puritan community. The history and the concern with values lead me 
to the conclusion that in this instance the volume of civil cases repre-
sents collective support of corporate values. 
Reaction during the second external crisis points to the same general 
conclusion. As the war progressed, the government leaders steadily in-
formed officials in London about their progress. When their reports 
were received, they were turned against Massachusetts by enemies who 
successfully requested an investigation of the Puritan colony. Thus, in 
June, 1676, the King's emissary, Edward Randolph arrived. He brought 
not only orders to investigate the colony but also the power to reopen 
the old Mason and Gorges family claims to New Hampshire and Maine. 
In August, 1676, the General Court appointed William Stoughton and 
Peter Bulkley to go to England to answer the charges against their 
charter.30 Thus, a second external crisis had begun before the govern-
ment had completely dealt with the war. 
Mason and Gorges family claims were based on old land grants which 
had been made before the Puritans had settled. Massachusetts had been 
an expansionist state and had moved into the territory which the two 
families claimed. Hence, Randolph brought with him new threats to 
the territorial integrity of Massachusetts. In addition he brought less 
direct threats. His instructions required him to send back the following 
information: which of their laws were contrary to English law, a census 
to establish estates (presumably for the purpose of taxation), the number 
of men mounted and on foot which the colony could field in battle, which 
forts and munitions they held, a complete map of the boundaries of the 
colony, which contact they had with the French and with the government 
of New York, and a list of persons most popular and either in or likely 
to be elected to the magistracy.31 
Charles II had confirmed the Puritans' charter in 1661, and, they be-
lieved, had also confirmed their administration in Maine. Charles had 
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given them liberty to show why they should govern the province, and, 
they reasoned, they had shown sufficient cause.32 When a royal govern-
ment was established for New Hampshire, leaders in Massachusetts de-
clared that they would no longer exercise jurisdiction there.33 They 
believed that they were right, but they knew that the threat to their 
territory was real. 
Late in 1677, when the Puritan leadership received information about 
Randolph's letters, they realized that they might lose not only territory 
but also the charter itself. In his first letter of June 17, 1676, Randolph 
had written: 
The governor of this place consists of a governor, 11 
magistrates and a secretary all yearly chosen; most of them 
are inconsiderable mechanics packed by the prevailing party 
of the factious ministry who have a fellow feeling both in 
the command and profit. . . . 
The clergy are generally inclined to sedition being 
proud ignorant and imperious, Owen and others—ejusdem 
ffarinae, are in great veneration here, yet there are some 
civil gentlemen among them that upon all occasions express 
their duty to his Majesty abominating the hipocracy of their 
Pharisaical Sanhedrim.34 
He later gave a fuller account of the government which, although it was 
still too sketchy to please the Committee for Trade and Plantations, 
served to intensify fear in Boston.35 
In other correspondence, Randolph answered the directed questions 
one by one, and his answers accused Massachusetts. He attacked their 
law: 
. . . laws and ordinances made in that colony are no longer 
observed than as they stand with their convenience. The 
magistrates not so strictly minding the letter of the law 
when their public interest is concerned, in all cases more 
regarding the quality and affection of the persons to their 
government than the nature of the offense.36 
His most telling criticisms were aimed at government and the adminis-
tration of law, from the perspective of the Puritans, at authority and 
the political contract. In both he saw disrespect toward the King. But 
Randolph never reduced his attacks on territorial jurisdiction in Maine. 
Moreover, he expanded his territorial threat when he proposed that 
land titles in Massachusetts were illegal, a proposal which understandably 
caused a flurry of counter activity in Massachusetts.37 From London 
Stoughton and Bulkley sent further information. Randolph was pressing 
his critical assessment. 
Even with this new information, the leadership waited and considered 
their plight. During the session of May, 1678, the General Court delayed 
any action. Finally, in October, 1678, the government began to bring 
the colony into compliance with demands from England. First, they 
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provided an oath of allegiance to the King. First things done, they 
dispatched a letter to Charles II explaining that the colony had meant 
no disrespect when it had no oath. Furthermore, in their letter they 
asserted that they had "proof" that Randolph's charges against them were 
false. In another letter to the Solicitor General they set forth their par-
ticular meaning for the term "commonwealth'' and gave a defense of 
their laws against Quakers. Still a third letter went to the Attorney 
General, and in it the Puritan leaders answered the specific complaints 
which Randolph had made against their laws.38 
At the same session the political leaders proved their concern for 
religious values. They appointed a day of humiliation, a usual act, but 
this time they appended to it several considerations or supplications to 
God: to protect their liberties, to grant a spirit of conversion for their 
children, and to provide a religious union of all the neighboring colonies 
(thus bringing them into blame and praise for ultimate repudiation or 
favor).39 These acts were responses to political tension among leadership 
and people. 
At the next session in May, 1679, the General Court passed acts 
relating to the customs. They provided public accommodation for 
shipping and punishment for abuse of the customs collectors (Randolph 
having been appointed chief of customs in the colony). At the same 
session they approved the following: 
In answer to a motion made by some of the reverend 
elders, that there might be a convening of the elders and 
messengers of the churches in form of a synod, for the 
révisai of the platform of discipline agreed upon by the 
churches, 1647, and what else may appear necessary for 
the preventing schisms, heresies, prophaness and the estab-
lishment of the churches in one faith and order of the 
gospel, this Court does approve of the said motion and 
order their assembling for the ends afforesaid. . .40 
Ministerial and governmental authority thus came together in the 
famous Reform Synod of 1679, orchestrated by Increase Mather and 
faithfully reported by his son, Cotton, in the Magnolia Christi Ameri-
cana. The report which the synod sent to government and churches was 
one long jeremiad, listing the provoking evils in the colony and reiterat-
ing the old corporate values of church and state. Although in his History 
Hutchinson noted that there was "no evidence of any extraordinary de-
generacy" among the people,41 the ministers and political leaders be-
lieved that there was. Under threat of the critical reports to London, 
with the knowledge that their territory was shrinking and that their 
charter was imperiled, the leaders of the colony turned again to their 
corporate ritual, a ritual which they thought had helped them overcome 
their enemies in the past. 
As the ritual and defensive actions unfolded, cases increased. Case 
volume rose from 89 in 1677-78 to 109 in 1678-79. There was literally 
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no attributable cause which could tie this increase to individual or 
disinterested claims. Moreover, during this year the non-Puritan mer-
chants, who normally used this court at the center of trade, came to 
court fewer times than in earlier years.42 Case volume thus appears to 
have increased in relation to the defense against a second external attack 
on values and on the colony itself. Circumstances here are as compelling 
as those at the end of King Philip's War. They provide further support 
for the thesis of this study. Together with the other historical incidents 
and changes in case volume, they create a fairly clear functional pattern 
in which the volume of civil cases appears to support authority and 
other corporate and legal values. 
iv 
What do we learn from and what are the implications of this unusual 
examination of political crises, values and legal behavior? We know that 
the broad extent of these crises caused tensions, possibly deep tensions, 
in the political culture of Puritan Massachusetts. We know from the 
records that the Puritan leadership, ministers and government alike, 
regarded these crises as attacks on the sustaining religious and political 
values of the community. We know from the case volume displayed on 
Graph 1 that in each instance of crisis, as the community leadership acted 
to reaffirm the values of the community, an unexplained change oc-
curred in the number of cases coming to the Suffolk County Court. 
Finally, according to functional theory, we know that if civil litigation 
were performing a supportive function for community values, it would 
decrease when the functional substitute created by politics provided a 
new avenue of support. On the other hand, it would increase when the 
crisis was external and greater support was necessary for the maintenance 
of community structures around the core of Puritan values. Such a 
pattern is evident in the case volume. 
My inference is that in Massachusetts, civil litigants came into the 
court in times of crisis not only to make individual claims but also, 
unconsciously, through participation in an important public structure, to 
support the religious and political values of their society. During the 
Half-Way crisis the proper religious support for values like authority and 
corporate duty became unclear. Shortly, the political campaign and 
election provided a new avenue for support, a functional alternative. 
Case volume went down, not dramatically, but enough to fit a func-
tional pattern. In the latter two crises, when Puritan authority and 
power were directly challenged from outside the community and when 
leadership exerted both moral and physical power in defense of the 
community, case volume went up dramatically. 
The impossibility of traditional historical documentation, the lack of 
complete court records before 1670 and the very unusual perception of 
civil law prevent more than an inference of support. Yet, if one accepts 
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a functional analysis as a possibility, the contemporaneous historical crises 
and authoritative statements about values, as well as acts in support of 
values, combine to explain the changes in case volume. Together, these 
three elements—history, values, case volume—form strong evidence that 
a functional connection existed between the social need for support of 
values and the numbers in which litigants used the court. 
The implication of this study is that our common ideas about civil 
law are culture-bound. Assuming that further study will strengthen my 
thesis, I suggest that civil law in society is much more complex than the 
advocates of individual or disinterested jurisprudence believe. When a 
latter-day John Smith goes to court to collect a debt, he may be collecting 
a debt. But he also may be performing a political, social or religious act. 
Through his participation in the legal process, in a social-psychological 
sense, he may be assuring himself and others that the latest attacks on 
political or social values have not destroyed the community. In a literal, 
psychological sense, he may be acting selflessly. I think that the evidence 
is strong enough to warrant further investigation. 
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